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AKRON LAW REVIEW
FOOD AND DRUG LAW:
THE INFANT FORMULA ACT OF 1980
INTRODUCTIONO UR CHILDREN have been characterized as this country's most valuable
natural resource.1 Without their normal mental and physical develop-
ment, they would simply not be capable of living a happy and fulfilled life.
This development depends, in large part, on their consumption of nutri-
tional foods during their first year of life. Because of omissions made in the
reformulation of two soy-based infant formulas in 1978, many children
developed blood and growth disorders; there is a strong possibility that
the children who ingested these formulas may suffer in the future.
The Infant Formula Act of 19802 (hereinafter the Act) was a cul-
mination of the efforts of mothers, physicians, reporters, administrators,
businessmen and congressmen to provide regulations and guidelines to pre-
vent similar tragic episodes in the future. This comment will focus on the
Act, as well as the events leading up to its promulgation. The examination
will begin with the remarkable discovery in infants of the rare affliction
known as metabolic alkalosis and the subsequent research which has estab-
lished a direct correlation between the defective formulas and the infants'
conditions. Despite an expedient voluntary recall of the formulas, controversy
raged in the media and in the Congress concerning the effectiveness of
that recall, criminal sanctions for alleged liable parties, and the enforcement
policy of the Food and Drug Administration (hereinafter FDA). Resolu-
tion of these issues, however, will not foretell the future development of
the affected children. Only time and long-range studies will provide reliable
answers to the questions of worried parents.
I. DISCOVERING THE DEFICIENCIES
Satisfactory infant formulas have only been on the market since the late
nineteenth century; the modem era did not begin until 1915 when research-
ers adapted the fat content of cows' milk to simulate human milk.' Many
of today's formulas are modifications of this basic formula which was named
S.M.A., for Synthetic Milk Adapted.- Infant formulas are available as pow-
' Infant Formula Act of 1980, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1936-37 (Sept. 26, 1980).
2 Pub. L. No. 96-359, 94 Stat. 1190 (codified sections at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 321, 331, 350a, 374
(Supp. IV 1980) and 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 830, 841-43, 873 (West 1981)).
3 Anderson, A Background Paper on Infant Formulas, LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH OFFICE
(Feb. 1980) (prepared for the Bureau of Foods, Food and Drug Administration), reprinted
in Nutritional Quality of Infant Formula: Hearings on H.R. 6590, 6608, 5836, 5839 Before the
Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 77, 79-80 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Nutritional Quality
Hearings].
4 1d. at 80.
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ders, liquid concentrates, and ready-to-feed products. Presently, the ready-
to-feed products are the most popular.5 By 1972, about seventy percent of
infants two months of age were receiving commercially prepared formulas.6
This trend has reversed within the last eight years, however, with forty-five
to eighty percent of mothers breast-feeding their infants after returning
home from the hospital.' This practice follows the prevailing opinion in
favor of breast-feeding infants whenever possible.8
Because of specific disorders or intolerance to human milk, or other
milk-based products, many infants must rely on synthetic formulations. The
most widely used are those derived from soybean components! Neo-Mull-
Soy and Cho-Free, manufactured by the Syntex Corporation, were two
such formulas."0 Before 1979, the ability of these formulas to supply ade-
quate amounts of nutrients had never been questioned. 1
In June of 1979, Dr. Shane Roy, a pediatric nephrologist at the Univer-
sity of Tennessee, examined two infants with symptoms that indicated failure
to thrive: poor appetite, failure to gain weight, diarrhea and blood in the
urine.' These symptoms originally indicated a Bartter-like syndrome, 3
however, the diagnosis of metabolic alkalosis was finally made." Both in-
fants were receiving Neo-Mull-Soy. Prior to these cases which were diag-
nosed in the same week, Dr. Roy had seen only seven cases of Bartter's
5 Id. at 83.
Old. at 88.
7 Id.
8 ld. (citing as authority the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Medical As-
sociation, and the Infant Formula Council).
9Id. at 89.
10 Syntex Corporation is a Panamanian corporation with offices located in Palo Alto, Cali-
fornia. The Company has facilities located throughout the world and produces a variety of
products such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals and nutritional goods. Infant nutritional prod-
ucts were obtained when Syntex purchased the infant formula line from the Borden Company
in 1971 and turned the production of these products over to Syntex Laboratories, Inc. in
Palo, Alto. Vaundell and Scott, FDA Establishment Inspection Report, Palo Alto, Cal.
(August 28, September 5, 17, 1979), reprinted in Infant Formula Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-47 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Gore Hearings]. See id.
at 95 (testimony of Paul E. Freiman, President of Syntex Laboratories, Inc.).
"1 Gore Hearings, supra note 10, at 95 (testimony of Paul E. Freiman). The product was
originally manufactured in 1940 and marketed under the name Mull-Soy. Telephone inter-
view with Jack Dillon, Assistant Director of Engineering, Borden, Inc. (March 26, 1982).
12 Gore Hearings, supra note 10, at 5-6 (testimony of Shane Roy). See Report, Infant Metab-
olic Alkalosis and Soy-Based Formula, MoRBEDrry WEEKLY REP. 358 (Aug. 3, 1979); Roy
& Arant, Alkalosis From Chloride-Deficient Neo-Mull-Soy, 301 NEw ENG. J. MED. 615
(1979); Roy & Cordero, Withdrawal of Two Soy-Based Infant Formulae, Tim LANcEr 462
(Sept. 1979).
13 See infra text accompanying notes 62-63.
"4Metabolic alkalosis is a chemical imbalance in the blood characterized by low levels
of chloride (Cl) (hypochloremic metabolic alkalosis), potassium (K) (hypokalemic metabolic
alkalosis), or combinations thereof. See infra text accompanying notes 61-68.
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Syndrome in fourteen years of practice.15 At first he did not feel that the
formula was at fault.
Approximately one month later, on July 24, 1979, Dr. Roy was noti-
fied of another infant who was diagnosed as having metabolic alkalosis.
When Dr. Roy asked the resident what formula the child was receiving,
the resident told him it was Neo-Mul-Soy.'0 The same day, Dr. Roy re-
ported the cases to Dr. John Ingram, Director of the Medical Services De-
partment of Syntex Laboratories. They had no prior cases on record."
The following day, Syntex called Dr. Roy to report that they had been noti-
fied of two additional cases in Boston. Syntex requested that Dr. Roy obtain
case lot numbers of the formula used by his patients.'
Dr. Roy called Syntex the next day (July 26, 1979) to report the
lot numbers and was informed that there were two more calls from Staten
Island, New York about infants who had received the formula and had been
affected. At this point, Dr. Roy called the county health department, the
hospital dietary department and the county pediatric society." The county
public health department reported these events to the Center for Disease
Control (hereinafter C.D.C.) in Atlanta. After a nationwide survey of
pediatric nephrologists, the C.D.C. contacted the FDA."
On July 27, 1979, all involved parties began to seriously investigate
the matter. Dr. Hurd, the plant manager of the Elgin, Illinois facility
was notified by Syntex to stop distributing the product.21 Representatives of
the FDA met with Dr. Roy in Tennessee and Dr. James Mutch of Syntex
in Palo Alto.2 Syntex sent mailgrams to approximately 24,000 pediatricians
and other physicians informing them of the reported cases and suggesting
15 Gore Hearings, supra note 10, at 6 (testimony of Shane Roy). Doctor Roy also checked
the formula against the product information and the ingredients appeared adequate. Id.
Product information is listed annually in the PHYsICIAN's DESK REFERENCE.
161d.
17 Id. at 5-6. Testimony revealed, however, that Syntex had in fact received a phone call on
July 2, 1979, from a physician. Because his call was in the nature of an "inquiry" rather
than a "report," Syntex asked only for sample cans so that the lot numbers could be checked.
There was no ingredient check made. Id. at 102-03 (testimony of Paul E. Freiman and
Virgil Thompson, Vice-President of Corporate Regulatory Affairs, Syntex Laboratories, Inc.).
28 Id. at 5-6 (testimony of Shane Roy). See also SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGA-
TIONS OF THE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH CONG., 2D SEss., RE-
PORT ON INFANT FORMULA, at 5 (COMM. PRINT 96-IFC 42, 1980) [hereinafter cited as
HOUSE SUBCOMM. REPORT].
19 Gore Hearings, supra note 10, at 5-7 (testimony of Shane Roy).
20Id. at 9 (testimony of Jose Cordero). This survey ascertained that there were thirty-one
reported cases. For twenty-seven of the cases, the type of formula was known: twenty-six
of the twenty-seven were using Neo-Mull-Soy. Id.
21 Bruederle & McCullough, FDA Establishment Inspection Report, Elgin, Ill. (Aug. 1, 2,
9, .1979) at 5.
22 Gore Hearings, supra note 10, at 5, 7, 27, 46.
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that they "maintain suitable viligance."23 Dr. Roy and Dr. Cordero of the
C.D.C. had several discussions about the C.D.C. survey and the results
of laboratory analysis of the formula that had begun the previous day. The
laboratory tests indicated that the chloride content of the formula was only
two milliequivalents per liter, one-third of the product information claim
(nine milliequivalents) and even less than the Committee on Nutrition of
the American Academy of Pediatrics recommendation (eleven milliequiva-
lents). 4 When Dr. Roy called Dr. Ingram at Syntex that evening to report
that "the mechanism for the production of the metabolic alkalosis was di-
rectly attributable to [the] low chloride intake," Dr. Ingram replied that
Syntex had also analyzed the formula and found that the chloride was low,
but "not that low.
2 5
By July 31, 1979, the San Francisco district office of the FDA recom-
mended an agency-initiated recall. 6 Syntex had already organized a Calif-
ornia meeting the next day to be attended by Dr. Roy, two other prominent
pediatric nephrologists, a representative from the C.D.C. and Dr. Ingram
of Syntex. 7 All of the information was reviewed at this meeting and the
recommendation was made to recall the formula immediately. 8 Late on
August 1st, Syntex made the decision to voluntarily recall the formulas.
The FDA granted approval of the recall documents prepared by Syntex, and
the announcements were made on August 2, 1979.29
Before turning to the recall and the medical evidence, it is appropriate
to review the events which led to the reduction (or deletion?) of sodium
and chloride levels in the formulas. It is clear now that it was not necessarily
the original reductions which led to the infants' conditions, but the failure
to monitor the nutrient levels thereafter.
23 Id. at 63, 67 (testimony of Paul E. Freiman); see, e.g., FDA Mailgram from John Ingram,
M.D., to physicians (July 27, 1979), reprinted in Gore Hearings, supra note 10, at 67.
24 Gore Hearings, supra note 10, at 7 (testimony of Shane Roy). See PHYsIcIANs' DESK RPF-
ERENCE, 1711, 1717 (33d ed. 1979) (these ingredients are listed for Cho-Free at 1711,
but not for Neo-Mull-Soy at 1717); Committee on Nutrition, American Academy of Pedi-
atrics [A.A.P.], Commentary on Breast-Feeding and Infant Formulas, Including Proposed
Standards for Formula, 57 PEnAnrucs 278, 278-85 (1976). These guidelines were updated
as of February 1980. See Infant Formula Act of 1980; Hearings on S. 2490 Before the Sub-
comm. on Health and Scientific Research of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Re-
sources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 117 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
25 Gore Hearings, supra note 10, at 5, 7 (testimony of Shane Roy). In fact, the Syntex assay
of one-hundred lots revealed very low levels. Only four lots contained chloride in amounts
close to the A.A.P. recommendations, 63% contained less than two milliequivalents per liter,
and several contained no chloride whatsoever. Memorandum of Syntex Laboratories, Inc.
from John Kjellstrand (Elgin, Ill.) to Jack Cohen (undated) (discussing analysis results in
1979 products), reprinted in Gore Hearings, supra note 10, at 91-92.
26 FDA San Francisco District Office Memo from Edward Cassidy to all district offices
(July 27, 1981).
27 Gore Hearings, supra note 10, at 5, 7 (testimony of Shane Roy). The FDA was not in-
vited to this meeting because of its "preliminary" nature and the concern that the agency's
presence might inhibit the free flow of information. Id. at 88 (testimony of Virgil Thompson).
2s Id. at 7 (testimony of Shane Roy).
29Id. at 5, 7, 64.
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II. PRODUCT REFORMULATION AND PROBABLE LIABILITY
A key event prior to the reformulation of the products was the decision
in December, 1977 to discontinue a routine assay for chloride levels."
The decision was allegedly made by a nutritionist at the Elgin, Illinois
facility because he felt that the assay was elective. He neglected to inform
anyone in the chain of command of the dropping of the assay. 1 The formulas
were reformulated and salt was reduced (deleted?) on March 20, 1978.1
This was in part based on the school of thought that hypertension and high
blood pressure later in life were related to high levels of sodium chloride
(salt) in foods.3" They were again reformulated in September and October
of 1978 when the soy protein isolates were changed.4
More than likely, Syntex will be held ultimately liable for the damages
sustained by infants who ingested Neo-Mull-Soy and Cho-Free. The extent of
that liability, of course, will depend on how many infants were harmed and
the probability of permanent injury. "It has been conservatively estimated
that more than 20,000 infants ingested defective soybean-based formulas
during the critical first months of life."3" Because of the large numbers
of children affected by the same products, class actions have been filed in
Cincinnati, Atlanta and other cities" but class status may not be granted
in any of these cases because of the inconsistencies in injuries.
Remedies should be obtainable in individual actions under a variety
of theories. Besides the traditional negligence and breach of warranty
routes, a tort action against the manufacturer based on strict liability should
30 Bruederle & McCullough, supra note 21, at 17. See, e.g., Gore Hearings, supra note 10, at
51.
31 Gore Hearings, supra note 10, at 89-90 (testimony of Paul E. Freiman).
32 Vaundell & Scott, supra note 10, at 51-52. Dr. Sidney Saperstein, principal scientist for
Syntex Laboratories, Inc., must ultimately approve any formula changes. Id. at 49. See Brue-
derle & McCullough, supra note 21, at 17.
33 Gore Hearings, supra note 10, at 89-90. For commentators' views on the levels of salt in
infant foods, see generally Filer, Salt in Infant Foods, 29 NUTRITION REV. 27 (1971);
Foman, Recommendations for Feeding Normal Infants, 63 PEDRIATMCS 52 (1979); Foman,
What are Infants Fed? 56 PEDIATRIcs 350 (1975); STEWART, SALT IN THE INFANT DIETARY,
EDITORIAL IN PEDIATRIC BASICS, (GERBER PRODUCTS Co. Issue 21 1978). These authors did
not, however, urge the disregard of the A.A.P. recommendations.
34 Vaundell & Scott, supra note 10, at 51-52. These changes probably had no causal relation-
ship to the resultant metabolic alkalosis.
35 Letter from James G. Butler, Esq. to the editor of the Research and Development De-
partment of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (Sept. 9, 1980) (discussing Syntex
infant formulas and possible liability to Syntex).86 Letter from Sidney W. Gilreath, Esq. to the Products Liability-Medical Malpractice Ex-
change of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (Dec. 27, 1979) (discussing class
actions against Syntex). Over three billion dollars worth of lawsuits have been filed against
Syntex, including a two-billion dollar class action in Memphis, Tennessee. Broadcast Ex-
cerpt from 20/20, Media Transcripts, Inc., March 13, 1980, at 15; Wash. Post, Dec. 10,
1979, at A4, col. 1. There have been no reported cases found at the time of this article's
printing, however.
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be available. 7 These product liability laws have favored maximum pro-
tection of human life by demanding that manufacturers be held liable for
defective products, regardless of the exercise of due care in the production
of the product.38 And because Syntex failed to warn the ultimate consumers
of the dangerous propensities of the formulas, an action in strict liability
or negligence based on the breach of their "duty to warn" would also be
appropriate.3"
Although the Infant Formula Act was not in effect at the time of the
Syntex formula deficiencies, violations of other laws could be litigated.
Syntex's acts in relation to certain provisions of the Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act [hereinafter F.D.C.A.] ° were the subject of inquiry in many of
the House and Senate hearings and reports.' The F.D.C.A. is primarily
intended to promote the public health and welfare by preventing adulterated
and misbranded substances from entering the marketplace. 2 Section 402
of the F.D.C.A. provides that "[a] food shall be deemed to be adulterated
87 Strict liability developed as an extension of negligence due to negligence theory's "road-
blocks to recovery" which include: 1) limitations on the maker's duty of care, 2) the diffi-
culty of satisfying the burden of proof as regards negligence (particularly because the
product is under the manufacturer's control), 3) the rules pertaining to proximate cause,
and 4) the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. Keeton Manufacturer's
Liability; The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 559, 560 (1969). Problems with breach of warranty actions lie primarily in the
notice requirements.
38 The concept of strict liability most often used in the United States is set out in the
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402-A (1965). For the history of the development of
strict liability in tort law see Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MiNN. L. REV.
791 (1966).
89 Liability based on negligent failure to warn is based on § 388 of the RESTATEMENT which
provides that the supplier, in order to incur liability, must: (a) know or have reason to know
that the chattel is dangerous; (b) have no reason to believe that the consumer will realize
the condition; and (c) fail to inform the consumer of the chattel's dangerous condition.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965). Strict liability, however, is not based on
whether the seller had reason to know of the danger or reason to know that the buyer was
unaware of the danger. Strict products liability is solely based on whether there was a defec-
tive product which was unreasonably dangerous. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABriTY, § 16A[4][f][vi] (1981). Dean Prosser notes:
[There] has (been] a general acceptance of the principle that in some cases the defendant
may be held liable, although he is not only charged with no moral wrongdoing, but has
not even departed in any way from a reasonable standard of intent or care . . . .This
new policy frequently has found expression where the defendant's activity is unusual and
abnormal in the community, and the danger which it threatens to others is unduly
great - and particularly where the danger will be great even though the enterprise is
conducted with every possible precaution.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 494 (4th ed. 1971). See Comment, The Case
for Strict Liability in the Infant Formula Industry, 6 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 89 (1980).
40 21 U.S.C. § 301-392 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
41 Gore Hearings, supra note 10, at 62-104; Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 42-48; HoUSE
SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 18, at 14-30.
4 S. REP. No. 712, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1953), reprinted in [1953] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2198. For an analysis of the history and purposes of the F.D.C.A. see Janssen,
The U.S. Food and Drug Law: How It Came; How It Works, 35 FOOD DRUG COSM. U.
132 (1980); Hutt; Food Legislation in Perspective, 34 FOOD DRUG CoSM. LU. 590 (1979).
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. . . if it is otherwise unfit for food; or . . . [i]f any valuable constituent
has been in whole or in part omitted or abstracted therefrom... ." The
primary issue under section 402 would be whether chloride is a valuable
constituent of infant formula or whether infant formula containing insuffi-
cient amounts of chloride is unfit as food.44 In light of the report of the
American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Nutrition and the regu-
lations of the Infant Formula Act, 5 inter alia, the House Subcommittee
found that chloride "clearly is a vital ingredient,"" and, therefore, section
402 had been violated.
In addition, the Subcommittee believed other sections of the F.D.C.A.
had been violated." Section 403 proscribes misbranding which could occur
through improper labeling or advertising. 8 After reviewing the claims made
by labels, promotional literature and advertisements, and comparing them
with the actual amounts of chloride contained in the formulas, the Sub-
committee found a clear violation. They also cited the reply by Mr. Virgil
Thompson (Vice-President, Corporate Regulatory Affairs, Syntex Labora-
tories, Inc.) to a query regarding the chloride concentration of Cho-Free:
"There is no question but that there are lower chloride levels in there than
are represented on the can.... " 9 Furthermore, section 301 (a) which pro-
hibits the "introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate com-
merce of any food, drug, device or cosmetic that is adulterated or mis-
branded"5 was believed to be violated.
It appears that it was not necessarily the reformulation of the products
that was harmful, but the failure to test the formulas and discover the
inadequate amounts of chloride following reformulation. Even though
43 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(3), (b)(1) (1976). Ohio's analogous provisions appear at Omo REv.
CoDE ANN. § 3715.59(C), (G) (Page 1980). Violations of Ohio's food and drug laws mak-
ing it a crime to sell adulterated food have been held to constitute negligence per se. Allen
v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.2d 167 (1960); Kurth v. Krumme, 143 Ohio St.
638, 56 N.E.2d 227 (1944); Portage Markets Co. v. George, 111 Ohio St. 775, 146 N.E.
283 (1924).
44HOUSE SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 18, at 14.
45 21 U.S.C. § 350a(g) (Supp. IV. 1980). See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
4e HousE SuScoMM. REPORT, supra note 18, at 14, 15.
471d. at 15-17.
48Two sections of the F.D.C.A. must be considered: § 403(a) provides that food shall
be deemed to be misbranded if: 1) its labeling is false or misleading in any particular, or
2) in the case of a § 411 food, its advertising is false or misleading in a material respect or
its labeling is in violation of § 411(b)(2). Section 201(n) provides factors to be considered
in determining whether labeling or advertising is misleading: representations made or sug-
gested by statement, word, design, device, or any combination thereof, and the extent to
which the labeling or advertising fails to reveal material facts are all considerations to be
taken into account. These factors must be weighed against resulting consequences of pro-
scribed or customary use. 21 U.S.C. §§ 343(a), 321(n) (1976). Ohio's provisions are found
at Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 3715.60 (Page 1980).
"9House SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 18, at 16.
502i U.S.C. § 331(a) (1976).
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Syntex admitted the error 5 and reacted quickly once the problem was dis-
covered, a majority of the Subcommittee felt so strongly about the situation
that the matter was referred to the Justice Department for criminal prose-
cution.? Because the F.D.C.A. imposes strict liability for violations, some
Subcommittee members "strenuously" dissented insofar as the report re-
ferred the investigation to the Justice Department.5" They stressed the cor-
poration's lack of knowledge that the formula was deficient, 4 their cooper-
ation with the FDA," possible due process violations,56 and most impor-
tantly, that the FDA had no regulations in effect governing the levels of
sodium and chloride.
5 7
Despite seemingly overwhelming evidence establishing statutory vio-
lations on the part of Syntex, proving that those violations caused a child's
injuries is another matter. "The question of causation has always been para-
mount in food cases.""5 Because this was the first time that chloride defi-
51 Mr. Gore: You reformulated your product after the testing for chloride was stopped. Is
that correct?
Mr. Freiman: That is correct.
Mr. Gore: And you didn't test for chloride after the reformulation. Is that correct?
Mr. Freiman: That is correct.
Mr. Gore: Another mistake, wasn't it?
Mr. Freiman: Yes.
Gore Hearings, supra note 10, at 90.
52 HousE SuBcoMm. REPORT, supra note 18, at 18. "Any person who violates a provision of
section 331 . .. shall not be imprisoned for more than one year or fined not more than
$1,000.00, or both," 21 U.S.C. § 333 (1976). Ohio's penalty provisions are set out in Oro
REv. CODE ANN. § 3715.99 (Page 1980).
5 3 HOUSE SuBcoMM. REPORT, supra note 18, at 22. "[A] recommendation of criminal prose-
cution . . . represents a quantum leap beyond the facts herein, and beyond what is necessary
to achieve the goal of safe and effective formulas." Id. The FDCA has withstood several
congressional challenges. Subsequent to the Act's passage, a proposed amendment that would
have imposed criminal liability only for violations committed willfully or as a result of gross
negligence died in a House-Senate conference. 44 CONG. REC. 8551, 8838 (1948). In United
States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975), the Supreme Court ruled that corporate officers could
be held criminally liable for virtually any preventable violation by subordinates. This decision
confirmed the conviction of the president of a large food chain for the offense of permitting
food to be exposed to rodents. 421 U.S. at 660. Liability was predicated on the degree of
responsibility borne by the officer, rather than on personal participation in the violation
itself. Therefore, the Court inferred that responsible corporate officials are required not
only to remedy violations when they occur, but to institute procedures to prevent their oc-
currence. 421 U.S. at 672. Following this decision, legislation seeking to limit vicarious
liability by establishing a negligence standard for the criminal liability of corporate officers
was proposed, but has not passed Congress. 122 CONG. REc. 7204-37 (1976). See Survey,
White-Collar Crime: Food and Drug, 18 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 336 (1980).
54 HousE SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 18, at 22.
55 Id. at 24-27. But see id. at 13, and Gore Hearings, supra note 10, at 55-56.
56 HouSE SuBcoMM. REPORT, supra note 18, at 28-29 (citing the Act's notice and hearing
procedures). 21 U.S.C. § 335 (1976).
5 7 HousE SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 18, at 14, 30. FDA requirements for infant foods
are codified at 21 C.F.R. § 105.65 (1981). They were updated in 1971, but never adopted
the 1976 A.A.P. recommendations. HOUSE SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 18, at 14-15. Never-
theless, the industry was aware of the updated guidelines. See Senate Hearings, supra note 24,
at 111-16. Although the FDA proposed to change their regulations to approximate those
of the A.A.P., their offer became moot when the Infant Formula Act established nutritional
requirements based on the A.A.P. recommendations. 21 U.S.C. § 350a(g) (Supp. IV 1980).
58 Condon, Products Liability - 1979, 35 FooD DRUG COSM. L.J. 404, 412 (1980).
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ciencies and associated developmental problems have appeared in humans, 9
the medical profession has responded with numerous case studies, articles
and reports to document the correlation between the ingestion of defective
formulas and the incidence of metabolic alkalosis.
HI. MEDICAL EVIDENCE
As previously stated, Dr. Shane Roy was the physician who brought
the infant formula problems to the attention of the public. Following his
discovery, nearly every medical commentator who has written on the sub-
ject has concluded that there exists some correlation between ingesting the
formula for a month or more and similar physical symptoms." Generally,
each investigation began with infants showing signs of failure to thrive which
may include weight loss or failure to gain weight, diarrhea, lethargy, refusal
to take other foods, dehydration, blood in the urine, and spitting-up. Their
growth rates were usually in the twenty-fifth percentile or below and some
even developed seizures and kidney problems."' The symptoms appeared
very similar to Bartter's syndrome, a rare situation where there is a failure
by the kidneys to absorb chloride into the body 2 causing chloride to be
readily detectable in the urine and stools. In all of the case reports, how-
59 See Grossman & Hellerstein, The Dietary Chloride Deficiency Syndrome, 66 PEDIATRICS 366
(Sept. 1980). Cf. Kassirer, The Critical Role of Chloride in the Correction of Hypokalemic
Alkalosis in Man, 38 AM. J. MED. 172 (1965) (discussing the vital role of chloride in the
renal handling of sodium). See infra note 116.
6 0 See Barness, Formula Manufacture and Infant Feeding, 243 J. AMER. MED. Assoc. 1075
(March 14, 1980); Committee on Nutrition, American Academy of Pediatrics, Commentary
on Breast-Feeding and Infant Formulas, Including Proposed Standards for Formula, 57
PEDRIATRICS 278, 278-85 (1976); Garin, Soybean Formula (Neo-Mul-Soy) Metabolic Alka-
losis in Infancy, J. OF PEDIATluCs 985 (Dec. 1979); Grossman & Hellerstein, The Dietary
Chloride Deficiency Syndrome, 66 PEDIATRICS 366 (Sept. 1980); Hellerstein, Metabolic Al-
kalosis and Neo-Mull-Soy, J. OF PEDiATRiCs 1083 (Dec. 1979); Holliday, Alkalosis in In-
fancy and Commercial Formulas, 65 PEDIATRICS 639 (March 1980); Letter, Withdrawal of
Two Soy-Based Infant Formulae, THE LANCET 462 (Sept. 1, 1979); Linshaw, Hypochloremic
Alkalosis in Infants Associated with Soy Protein Formula, J. OF PEDIATRICS 635 (April,
1980); Report, Infant Metabolic Alkalosis and Soy-Based Formula, MORBIDITY AND MORTALI-
TY WEEKLY REP. 358 (Aug. 3, 1979); Report, Follow-up on Formula-Associated Illness in
Children, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 124 (March 21, 1980); Report, Follow-
up on Infant Metabolic Alkalosis, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 364 (Aug. 10,
1979); Report Follow-up Study of Infants Fed Soybean-Based Formulas, 96 PUB. HEALTH
REP. 93 (Jan.-Feb. 1981); Reznik, Neo-Mull-Soy Metabolic Alkalosis: A Model of Bartter's
Syndrome?, 66 PEDIATRICS 784 (Nov. 1980); Roy & Arant, Alkalosis From Chloride-Defic-
ient Neo-Mull-Soy, 301 NEW ENG. J. MED. 615 (1979); Simopoulos and Bartter, The
Metabolic Consequences of Chloride Deficiency, 38 NUTRITION REv. 201 (June 1980); Wolfs-
ford & Senior, Failure to Thrive and Metabolic Alkalosis, 243 J. AMER. MED. Assoc. 1068
(March 14, 1980).
61 Id. See, e.g., correspondence and questionnaire from Formula (a group organized by two
Washington, D.C. parents of affected children, Carol Laskin and Lynne Pilot) to requesting
parents (Formula, P.O. Box 39051, Washington, D.C. 20016); Wash. Post, Dec. 10, 1979,
at AS.
62 Report, Infant Metabolic Alkalosis and Soy-Based Formula, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 358 (Aug. 3, 1979); Reznick, supra note 60, at 785.
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ever, none of the infants revealed chloride in their urine or stools.6 3 Normal
electrolyte levels in the sweat ruled out cystic fibrosis.8 4 The obvious next
step was to determine if the infants were in fact receiving the necessary levels
of chloride.
Although all of the published case reports resulted in solving the prob-
lem, the methods of detection differed. Some physicians went directly to the
formula, analyzed it, and discovered the problem.65 Others used an elimination
technique to either supplement the defective formula or use a different formula
when the symptoms caused by the defective formula did not abate. Some
physicians used both the formula analysis and elimination techniques.66
Generally, the physicians who went directly to the defective formula to
analyze it were in a situation where they had two or more patients with
similar symptoms and the defective formula was the common denominator.
Despite the fact that none of the case histories revealed exactly the same
symptoms, 7 all the infants had some form of metabolic alkalosis and all
had been taking Cho-Free or Neo-Mull-Soy for a month or more."
Clearly, the evidence indicates a direct causal relationship between
the low chloride levels of Neo-Mull-Soy and Cho-Free and the resultant
metabolic alkalosis described in the literature. Many infants who ingested
these formulas and did not develop metabolic alkalosis either did not take
enough of it for a long enough period of time or, more likely, had their
diets supplemented so as to receive necessary nutrient levels from other
sources.69 But, "infants receiving a diet consisting almost exclusively of Neo-
Mull-Soy [or Cho-Free] developed the dietary chloride deficiency syndrome
because the manufacturer, Syntex Laboratories, Inc., failed to maintain prop-
er quality control in the preparation of their infant formulas."" Unfortunate-
63 Garin, supra note 60, at 986, Grossman & Hellerstein, supra note 60, at 367-70; Hellerstein,
supra note 60, at 1083-84; Linshaw, supra note 60, at 639; Reznick, supra note 60, at 785;
Simopoulos & Bartter, supra note 60, at 202; Wolfsford & Senior, supra note 60, at 1069.
64 Simopoulos & Bartter, supra note 60, at 202; Wolfsford & Senior, supra note 60, at 1069.
85 Hellerstein, supra note 60, at 1084. Dr. Hellerstein was one of the physicians who attended
the Aug. 1, 1979 meeting in California and urged Syntex to recall the product. Roy & Arant,
supra note 59, at 615; Wolfsford & Senior, supra note 60, at 1069.
66 Garin, supra note 60, at 985-86; Grossman & Hellerstein, supra note 60, at 366-67;
Holliday, supra note 60, at 640 (Dr. Holliday was another participant at the August 1,
1979 meeting.). Linshaw, supra note 60, at 637; Reznick, supra note 60, at 785; Roy &
Arant, supra note 60, at 615.
67 Compare Report, Infant Metabolic Alkalosis and Soy-based Formula, MORBmTY AND
MORTALrrY WEEKLY REP. 358, at 358 (Aug. 3, 1979) (where one of the three infants had
constipation and the other two had diarrhea) with Grossman & Hellerstein, supra note 60,
at 369 (where four of twelve infants were dehydrated but the other six were not).
8s Following one infant's switch to Neo-Mull-Soy at age five months, the typical symptoms
began to appear four to six weeks later. Reznick, supra note 60, at 784. Other case histories
indicated that the symptoms did not appear until an infant had been on the defective
formula for three to five months. Grossman & Hellerstein, supra note 60, at 366.
49 See Garin,. supra note 60, at 987; Grossman & Hellerstein, supra note 60, at 372.
70 Grossman & Hellerstein, supra note 60, at 374 (emphasis added).
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ly, for Syntex Laboratories, as well as the infants affected, this opinion is
virtually unanimous. There are also indications that many infants developed
these same problems while using Neo-Mull-Soy or Cho-Free before the
March, 1978 product reformulation. 1
IV. THE RECALL
The greatest controversy of the entire formula episode was generated
after the medical investigators pursuaded Syntex to recall its products. "Re-
calls are undertaken voluntarily by manufacturers and distributors, or at
the request of the FDA, when the agency considers a product to be in violation
of the laws it administers. The FDA does not have the authority to mandate
product recalls."72 Following the August 1, 1979 decision to recall its
formulas, Syntex repeated the mailgram to the initial 24,000 physicians it
sent warnings to the week before - only this time, it was for a complete
recall.73 That same day, Syntex also mailed a first class letter, marked on
the envelope with the words in red: "Urgent: Product Recall," to over
100,000 physicians and pediatric nurses."" In addition to press statements
that were carried by radio, television and newspapers, Syntex sent similar
first class letters to all direct customer wholesalers, hospitals, food mar-
kets, drug stores and food brokers. These were followed with additional
letters and phone calls."5 Salesmen were ordered to go beyond their normal
71Formula correspondence and questionnaire, supra note 61 (emphasis added); Broadcast
Excerpt from 20/20, Radio TV Reports, Inc., Jan. 15, 1981, at 3-4. This could be attributed
to the formulas if they were deficient in the A.A.P. nutrient recommendations prior to the
reformulation.
712 House Subcomm. Report, supra note 18, at 6. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 7.1-7.59 (1981) for the
FDA's enforcement and recall policy.
73 Gore Hearings, supra note 10, at 64.
74 Id. FDA Memo from Edward Cassidy to all district offices (Oct. 24, 1979).
75 Gore Hearings, supra note 10, at 64-79. All the letters contained basically the same in-
formation as set out below, with any differences characteristic of the recipient's obligations:
Dear Doctor: Syntex is initiating a recall of its current stocks of Neo-Mull-Soy and
Cho-Free soy formulas because the products were believed to be manufactured with
chloride levels that were too low.
Infants primarily at risk are those who are essentially dependent on these soy
formulas for their overall nutrition as well as those subject to unusual stresses leading
to chloride loss such as vomiting, diarrhea, severe anorexia and/or extreme sweating.
When signs of failure-to-thrive anorexia, lassitude, or failure to gain weight are seen,
physicians are urged to check whether Neo-Mull-Soy and/or Cho-Free products may
have been used. If so, blood electrolyte levels, including chloride levels, should im-
mediately be obtained.
If electrolyte abnormalities such as hypokalemia, hypochloremia, and increased
bicarbonate are evident, the child should be further evaluated for additional signs such
as urinary levels of chloride less than 10 milliequivalents per liter, elevated BUN, or
microhematuria.
A panel of experts convened by Syntex has recommended that an individualized
management program for this type of metabolic alkalosis should include immediate
discontinuance of Neo-Mull-Soy or Cho-Free formulas, and appropriate corrective meas-
ures. These may include restoration of fluid and electrolyte balance.
If you have any inventory of Neo-Mull-Soy or Cho-Free samples, please quarantine
them until a Syntex representative contacts you regarding their disposition. Also, please
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rounds to effectuate the recall - over 26,000 visits were made in an at-
tempt to clear territories of Neo-Mull-Soy and Cho-Free by September
15th. 6 By November 1st, over two million cans of the product were de-
stroyed in a recall that cost over four million dollars."'
The recall, notwithstanding the good faith efforts accompanying it,
was not totally successful. Through a variety of communication mix-ups
and misinterpreted instructions dealing with the monitoring of the recall,
there were reports of defective formula being available on store shelves
the same day as Representative Gore's Subcommittee Hearing, November
1, 1979 - nearly three months after the recall began."' Mr. Gore in-
dicated that the General Accounting Office found 132 cans in a spot check,
NBC affiliates found cans in several cities and his own staff found it in his
congressional district. "People have called in saying they found it on the
shelves. It is still on the shelves. The recall was not effective." 9
Syntex countered with evidence indicating the practical difficulties of
coordinating such an extensive recall.8" Other factors contributing to the
problem were: 1) some merchants not receiving direct communication from
Syntex were not direct customers and 2) Syntex also reformulated the
products to contain adequate levels of sodium chloride, then shipped them
before the FDA requested that they cease and desist.8 ' From Syntex's and
complete the enclosed business reply card indicating the quantity on hand and return
it to the Syntex Director of Quality Control.
For the present, physicians are advised that other soy formulas should be used.
Syntex will inform you concerning the future availability of its soy-formula products.
Very truly yours, John S. Ingram, M.D., Director, Medical Services, Syntex Labo-
ratories, Inc. (Enclosure)
Id. at 68.
718Id. at 65; See, e.g., FDA Memo from Rick Casey to all field personnel (Aug. 6, 1979)
(discussing corporate standards for carrying out the recall).
77 Gore Hearings, supra note 10, at 65, 97. "Syntex has spared no expense and has made
every effort to inform wholesalers, retailers, and consumers of the recall and to remove the
product from the market." Id. at 65 (testimony of Paul E. Freiman). By February of 1980,
Syntex had destroyed over eight million cans of formula. HousE SuBcOMM. REPORT, supra
note 18, at 23 (dissenting views of Representative Lent).
78 Gore Hearings, supra note 10, at 80-84, 103-04. FDA Memo from Edward Cassidy to
Syntex and to all district offices (Oct. 26, 1979) (discussing recall procedures). The furor
was originally sparked by Washington reporter, Lea Thompson of television station WRC. In
a series of broadcasts that began in September, she brought the entire tragedy to the public's
eye - and to Congress'. See transcript of Lea Thompson, WRC-TV (Wash. D.C.), Oct. 25,
1979; broadcast excerpt from Today, Radio TV Reports, Inc., Oct. 29, 1979. Her perseverence
paid off when she joined mothers and congressmen in the Oval Office to receive congratu-
lations from President Jimmy Carter and to witness the signing of the Infant Formula Act.
Infant Formula Act of 1980, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1936, 37 (Sept. 26, 1980).
79 Gore Hearings, supra note 10, at 103.
so Of the 1000 direct account pharmacies that Syntex sold to in the Washington, D.C. area,
the product was found in only fourteen stores; only two of those actually had products on
the shelves. In addition, Syntex dealt with over 100,000 accounts annually. Id. at 83, 98.
S lId. at 65, 83, 99, 104. This cease and desist order was following an original clearance by
the FDA for Syntex to market its reformulated product. See HOUSE SUBCoMM. REPORT, sUpFq
note 18, at 23.
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the FDA's point of view, the recall was ninety-five percent effective as of
November 1, 1979.2
There is no doubt that some of the recall confusion was generated
by the FDA itself. In addition to reversing the decision to allow Syntex
to market Neo-Mull-Soy once the nutrient levels were corrected, attaching
the proper class designation to the recall proved to be controversial.8 " On
the day that Syntex announced the recall, the FDA Health Hazard Evalu-
ation Board convened and unanimously declared the products as potential
"life threatening, subacute" hazards. 4 The Division of Regulatory Guidance
then classified the recall as Class II, as opposed to the recommended Class
I." Although it was a close call, Commissioner Jere E. Goyan of the FDA
testified that he would "make it a Class I today."88
Another source of embarrassment was the recall monitoring by the
FDA. "FDA's Bureau of Foods intended its instructions to require a certain
level of audit on the part of the FDA; the instructions were, however, in-
terpreted by [the] San Francisco office to refer to the minimum level to be
undertaken by the firm."8" The FDA actually intended Syntex to conduct
a Level A effectiveness check - requiring one hundred percent contact
with consignees - whereas the FDA would then conduct their own Level
C effectiveness check - requiring only ten percent contact with consignees."
Through the misinterpretation by the San Francisco office, Syntex pnly
carried out a ten percent check. The FDA made no effectiveness checks
until a week before the House Subcommittee Hearing. 9
82 Gore Hearings, supra note 10, at 24; HousE SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 18, at 12.
83 Once a decision is made to follow the voluntary process, FDA regulations require the
establishment of a recall strategy. The recall strategy addresses three elements regarding
the conduct of the recall: 1) depth of the recall, 2) public warning, and 3) effectiveness
checks. 21 C.F.R. § 7.42 (1981). In addition, an ad hoc committee evaluates the health
hazard. HOUSE SUBcoMM. REPORT, supra note 18, at 8.
84 Health Hazard Evaluation Form, reprinted in Gore Hearings, supra note 10, at 35 and
HOUSE SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 18, at 8.
85 HOUSE SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 18, at 9. The difference between the recall classes
is as follows:
I) Class I is a situation in which there is a reasonable probability that the use of, or
exposure to, a violative product will cause serious adverse health consequences or death.
2) Class R is a situation in which use of, or exposure to, a violative product may
cause temporary or medically reversible adverse health consequences or where the
probability of serious adverse health consequences is remote.
3) Class III is a situation in which use of, or exposure to, a violative product is not
likely to cause adverse health consequences.
21 C.F.R. § 7.3(m)(l)-(3) (1981).
86 Gore Hearings, supra note 10, at 43.
87 Id. at 30 (statement by Jere E. Goyan, Commissioner of the FDA).
8 8HousE SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 18, at 11-13. Recall strategy and descriptions of the
various effectiveness checks are codified at 21 C.F.R. § 7.42 (1981).
19 HOUSE SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 18, at 12. The evolution of the FDA's recall and
seizure powers has taken an interesting course since its inception in the 1950's. It is true that
there is no explicit statutory authority for FDA mandated recalls; the courts have so held,
allowing only seizure proceedings and requests for voluntary recalls. United States v. C.E.B.
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V. THE INFANT FORMULA ACT
The Subcommittee presented their recommendation to Congress in
February of 1980 that legislation be enacted requiring testing of infant
formulas before marketing and after any reformulation. 00 The House con-
sidered four bills over the next few months"1 and the Senate considered one,
while continuing to hold hearings over the early part of the summer." A
compromise House bill93 incorporating the language of the Senate bill was
ultimately passed by both houses.9 It was signed into law by President
Jimmy Carter on September 26, 1980,"5 and codified as new section 412
of the F.D.C.A.9 8
The Infant Formula Act "creates a separate category of food designated
'infant formula' and requires that formula meet specified standards of quality
and safety."9 It also grants authority for the Secretary of the FDA "to
Products, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. 111. 1974). But see United States v. K-N Enterprises,
Inc., 461 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Il. 1978) which directly conflicts with the earlier district
court opinion in granting a preliminary injunction and a prayed-for recall of the manufac-
turer's violative products. See Comment, Mandatory Food and Drug Recalls - An Analysis
of a Developing FDA Enforcement Tool, UTAH L. Rav. 809 (1980). Although this comment
makes reference to some of the early newspaper articles concerning the instant defective
formula situation to support her argument in favor of mandatory FDA recalls, examination
of all the facts at this point does not seem to support adoption of that position. Despite
some beliefs that Syntex did not cooperate with the FDA, the more reasonable view is
that they did. Recall orders are usually unnecessary. If a company does refuse to cooperate,
the equitable power of the courts to grant the prayed-for recall would be adequate where
the protection of the public was at stake. The FDA itself does not feel that mandatory
recall authority is necessary: "It is far more important to have improved record keeping by
firms, inspectional authority for those records, product coding, and plans to implement
recalls, than to have mandatory recall authority." Statement by Jere E. Goyan, reprinted in
Nutritional Quality Hearings, supra note 3, at 76 and Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at
86. See infra note 109 and text accompanying notes 106-109. Furthermore, S. REP. No. 96-
916, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (Aug. 26, 1980), reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2858 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 96-916] recognizes the K-N Enterprises decision and
expressly provides for the Secretary to request an injunction from a federal court (to order
a recall) pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 332 (1976). The "Court may or may not exercise their
statutory authority and order the recall." S. REP. No. 96-916 supra, at 2866 (emphasis
added). See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
90HouSE SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 18, at 20. Their specific recommendations are set
out in S. REp. No. 96-916, supra note 89, at 2861-71.
9' The four bills under consideration were: H.R. 6590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R.
6608, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 5836, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); and H.R. 5839,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
92 The bill considered was: S. 2490, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). See Senate Hearings,
supra note 24.
93 H.R. 6940, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). See S. REP. No. 96-916 supra note 89, at 2859-
60.
94The House considered and passed the bill on May 20th and September 9, 1980. The
Senate considered and passed the bill on September 8, 1980. See S. RP. No. 96-916, supra
note 89, at 2858.
95 Infant Formula Act of 1980, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1936-37 (Sept. 26, 1980).
a9 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 321, 331, 350a, 374 (Supp. IV 1980) and 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 830, 841-43,
873 (West 1981). Sections 830, 841-43, and 873 were actually riders to the Infant Formula
Act relating to drug law enforcement, piperidine (PCP) reporting, and marijuana trafficking
penalties, and therefore, are not dealt with in this comment..
07 S. Rm,. No. 96-916, supra note 89, at 2858.
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establish nutritional, quality control, record keeping, notification and recall
requirements necessary to insure that infant formula is safe and will promote
healthy development." s
The body of the Act which begins at section 2(a), establishes nutri-
tional, quality and processing requirements that must be met for a formula
to be considered unadulterated. These requirements are either set out in
the Act or are established by the Secretary of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare.99
Rather than delegate to an administrative body the task of establishing
a list of required nutritional ingredients for normal, full-term infants, Con-
gress wisely chose to include one in the statute itself:'
The Committee has elected to specify an initial list of ingredients in
the statute to ensure that uniform standards for infant formula will be
in place upon the effective date of the legislation [ninety days after
September 26, 1980] . . . . [I]t would be irresponsible public policy
to permit the effective establishment of formula safety and quality
standards to be delayed one or two years due to the procedural re-
quirements of the rule making process.""
The table of ingredients, which includes minimum (and a few maxi-
mum) requirements for protein, vitamins and minerals, reflects the recom-
mendations of the American Academy of Pediatrics.0 2 Flexibility is ac-
complished by empowering the Secretary to revise the nutrient list as well
as the nutrient levels.' In addition, the Secretary may establish quality
factors and quality control procedures to ensure the Act's effectiveness.'
Notice provisions are found in section 2(b). Manufacturers must notify
the Secretary that their products are in compliance with the Act: 1) ninety
days before the first processing of a formula intended for commercial or
charitable distribution, and 2) any time before the first processing of a re-
formulation or reprocessing, where the manufacturer reasonably believes
98 Id. at 2874.
99 21 U.S.C. § 350a(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
'
0 0 d. § 350a(g).
Ift S. REP. No. 96-916, supra note 89, at 2862.
10 2 Id. at 2867.
103 21 U.S.C. § 350a(a) (2) (Supp. IV 1980). Note that by adopting these recommendations
as law - including those for sodium, potassium, and chloride - the FDA was relieved
of the responsibility of establishing guidelines for 21 C.F.R. § 105.65(c) (1981). Realistic-
ally, though, the revision authority granted to the Secretary most likely will be delegated to
the FDA.
104 21 U.S.C. § 350a(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). Quality factors are those considerations per-
taining to maintaining the potency of the nutrients during the product's expected shelf life.
Quality control procedures, in addition to "good manufacturing practices" applicable to foods,
are intended to ensure that safety and quality are "built into" the formula manufacturing
process. Quality control procedures include the periodic testing of infant formulas. S. REP.
No, 96-916, supra note 89, at 2862-63.
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that such reformulation may affect the product's status as unadulterated. 10 5
Section 2(c) places an additional prompt notification requirement on the
manufacturer who has knowledge which "reasonably supports the conclusion"
that the formula may present a risk to human health or may be otherwise
adulterated. 6
Although the FDA does not have the power to order a recall,"' section
2(d) authorizes the Secretary to become actively involved through regu-
lation of the scope and extent of a recall.' The Act also requires him to
review (every fifteen days) actions taken under the recall while mandating
that a manufacturer submit status reports (every fourteen days from the
beginning of the recall) on all actions to implement the recall. 10 9 These
review and reporting requirements end only upon the termination of the
recall."0
Section 2(c) requires manufacturers to make and retain distribution
records, for up to two years, to improve the monitoring and effectiveness of
recalls."' Although the Senate Subcommittee report concurs with this re-
quirement, their statement that this subsection would also provide the Secre-
tary with authority to inspect those records could be open to controversy."'
There is no express authority in this provision to inspect factories or records.
In order to carry out the purpose of section 2(c), however, the authority
might be inferred from the power granted to regulate the making of those
records (which was required to enable an effective monitoring of a recall),
10521 U.S.C. § 350a(b) (Supp. IV 1980). A manufacturer does not need any preclearance
or approval to market a formula, however. All that is required is formal notification. See
S. REP. No. 96-916, supra note 89, at 2863.
10821 U.S.C. § 350a(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). "Knowledge" is defined as "(A) the actual
knowledge that the manufacturer had, or (B) the knowledge which a reasonable person
would have had under like circumstances or which would have been obtained upon the
exercise of due care." Id. § 350a(c)(2). By combining a subjective standard with a liberal
objective standard, Congress intended to provide the Secretary with a timely opportunity
to review any potential health risks that might result from the use of an infant formula.
The Senate Report approached understatement when they noted that many other products are
subject to similar consumer protection statutes: "The Committee believes the protections
provided consumers of infant formula should at least be equivalent to that already available
to purchasers of snowmobiles and hairdryers." S. REP. No. 96-916, supra note 89, at 2864.
107 See supra note 89.
10821 U.S.C. § 350a(d) (Supp. IV 1980).
109 Id.
110 Id. It is apparent that these measures, along with § 2(e) of the popular Act and § 274
of the codification, were in indirect response to FDA Commissioner Jere Goyan's testimony
regarding the lack of power on the part of his agency to effectively regulate and monitor
record keeping and recalls. See supra note 89 and text accompanying notes 82-88. Indeed,
the Committee stated that "the events of [the summer of 1979] indicate the necessity of
these requirements. Two chloride deficient formulas were left on the market fully three
months after 'voluntary' recalls had been initiated." S. REP. No. 96-916, supra note 89, at
2865.
"'21 U.S.C. § 350a(e) (Supp. IV (1980).
112 S. REP. No. 96-916, supra note 89, at 2866.
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or from the power granted to regulate the retention of those records.'13
Section 2(c) alone seems inadequate to authorize the inspection of factories
and records.
Express authority for the inspection of factories and certain records
is found in section 4 of the Infant Formula Act which amended the general
inspection provisions of the F.D.C.A." ' This section provides that upon
proper identification and with written notice, duly authorized persons may,
at reasonable times and in a reasonable manner, enter establishments where
infant formulas are manufactured or held."1 5 Upon entrance the agents may
verify records to confirm whether the formula meets the requirements of
section 2 of the Act.1 6 Certain exclusions provide exemptions for financial
data, sales data (other than shipment data), pricing data and certain per-
sonnel and research data."' All inspections must be "commenced and com-
pleted with reasonable promptness.""'
Because some infant formulas are manufactured for infants with in-
born errors of metabolism, low birth weights or other unusual medical or
dietary problems, Congress has exempted formulas for these infants (if prop-
erly represented and labeled) from the adulteration, new processing and
reprocessing notice requirements of the Act.1 9 The manufacturers are re-
quired, however, to provide the "reasonable knowledge" notice when it
appears that the special formula may be adulterated or misbranded. 2
Congress recognized the need for formulas tailored to specific medical or
dietary requirements. Concern that manufacturers would feel the regula-
tions of the Act too cumbersome and therefore elect not to manufacture
special formulas encouraged the exemption. 2' By providing the Secretary
with discretion to regulate these formulas, Congress sought to ensure high
standards for all formulas while not discouraging this essential service.,'
Finally, section 7 of the Act requires reports to be submitted to Con-
gress by the Secretary of Health and Human Services to study, inter alia, the
"is21 U.S.C. § 350a(e)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
14Id. § 374(a).
5 Id. § 374(a)(1).
116 Id. § 374(a) (3).
"11Id. § 374(a)(1).
I's Id.
219 Id. § 350a(f)(1).
120 Id.
121 S. REP. No. 96-916, supra note 89, at 2867.
122 Id. Additionally, the Secretary may withdraw this exemption if his prescribed regulations
and conditions are not met. 21 U.S.C. § 350a(f)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). Questions remain,
however, about whether a soy-based formula would fall into this category. Although the
statute is silent on the matter and the Senate Report does not include soy-based formulas in
the few examples that they provide, it seems tenable that they could fall under the category
of providing nutrition to an infant with a "dietary problem."
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long-term health effects on infants who developed hypochloremic metabolic
alkalosis."' These tests, along with independent medical research and the
studies being conducted by the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, will
provide answers to the uncertainties surrounding the scope of injury to
children who ingested Neo-Mull-Soy and Cho-Free."2 4
CONCLUSION
There are no definite answers for parents whose children developed
metabolic alkalosis as a result of ingesting Neo-Mull-Soy and Cho-Free.
It is clear that there is concern for the proper mental and physical develop-
ment of the affected infants. 2 5 Legislative hearings and news reports are
replete with statements by parents concerning their anger and frustration
over the original problems as well as their deep-seated fear that their children
will develop improperly.2 6 Before discovery of the deficiencies, mothers had
been consistently accused of being "overanxious."'27 Most physicians just
did not make the connection between the formula and the symptoms. 1"8
Now parents find their children developing "improperly" and diagnosed
as having "delayed gross motor development."'2 9 While most infants improved
with a new formula or a chloride supplement, some did not.'
Future lawsuits are inevitable. Undoubtedly Syntex will use the defense
in these suits that the children would have developed abnormally notwith-
standing the defective formula.' A plaintiff will need to produce evidence
tending to show that the child was not suffering from the symptoms of
metabolic alkalosis before consuming the defective formula or that the
formula was a substantial contributing factor to their conditions. The burden
on the plaintiff will be difficult in view of the fact that even though physicians
123S. REP. No. 96-916, supra note 89, at 2877. Section 7 is one of the uncodified sections
of the Infant Formula Act.
124 A team of investigators at the National Institute of Health has begun a five-year follow-
up study in conjunction with the Center for Disease Control to examine infants who con-
sumed a defective formula and subsequently developed metabolic alkalosis. Report, Follow-
up Formula-Associated Illness in Children, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 124
(March 21, 1980); Report, Follow-up Study of Infants Fed Soybean-Based Formulas, 96
PuB. HEALTH REP. 93, 94 (Jan.-Feb. 1981).
125 "Infants grow most rapidly during the first 4 to 6 months of life. Nutrient requirements
are most critical in this period during which nutritional deficiencies can have lasting effects
on growth and development." Nutritional Quality Hearings, supra note 3, at 133. See Simo-
poulos & Bartter, supra note 60, at 204.
2 See generally, Senate Hearings, supra note 23, at 49-71 (testimony of parents); Nutritional
Quality Hearings, supra note 3, at 1.
127 Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 50 (testimony of Mrs. Barbara Gasper).
12 Id. at 57 (testimony of Mrs. Janet Marcantonio).
229 Id. at 49 (testimony of Mrs. Lynne Pilot).
131 Id. at 65 (testimony of Mrs. Lynne Pilot).
is Although it is probably inadmissable evidence, it is interesting to note that due to ad-
verse publicity, inter alia, Syntex discontinued production and distribution of Neo-Mull-Soy
and Cho-Free as of March 31, 1981. See letter from Tom Guntly, Manager of Distributor
Relations, Syntex Laboratories, Inc., to Syntex Customers, March 13, 1981.
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suspect that delayed or improper development is linked to chloride de-
ficiencies at an early age, there is as yet no conclusive medical evidence."' 2
The passage of the Infant Formula Act will tend to reduce the chances
of a similar incident occurring in the future. Although many criticize in-
creased government regulation in principle, Larry Pilot, a former FDA
attorney and father of an affected child, has remarked that increased regu-
lation does not necessarily mean that there cannot also exist excellent regu-
lation. 3 In retrospect, he, along with many others, probably wishes that
the Infant Formula Act had been in effect just a few years earlier.
RANDAL D. SHIELDS
132 Holliday, supra note 60, at 640; Linshaw, supra note 60, at 640; Simopoulos & Bartter,
supra note 60, at 204. Children who suffered from pyloric stenosis, a chloride deficiency in
infants caused by vomiting due to an obstruction at the outlet of the stomach, have been
shown to have discrete learning disorders five to fifteen years later, primarily in tasks that re-
quire short-term memory or arithmetic. Holliday, supra note 60, at 640 (citing Klein,
Effects of Starvation in Infancy (Pyloric Stenosis) on Subsequent Learning Abilities, 87 J.
PEDIATRCS 8 (1975)). Also, studies with rats who were injected with angiotensin (a chem-
ical that is increasingly produced in the presence of hypokalemic alkalosis) five minutes
after they had learned a passive avoidance task, showed that the retention of that task was
disrupted twenty-four hours later. Simopoulos & Bartter, supra note 60, at 204. These results
are mentioned in a report by Dr. Shane Roy, who cogently summarizes the prognosis for
children affected by the chloride-deficient formulas:
The medical literature contains numerous references covering the long-term effects
of protein-calorie malnutrition upon both experimental animals (rats, pigs, dogs) and
upon human infants. The effects of chloride malnutrition (or deprivation) upon the
developing human infant, however, has not been studied to my knowledge.
There are 3 specific causes of chloride deficiency either from losses through the
gastrointestinal tract or the genito-urinary system. These are 1) pyloric stenosis (vomit-
ing from an obstruction at the outlet of the stomach), 2) congenital chloride diarrhea,
and 3) Bartter's syndrome (chloride loss in the urine).
Children with pyloric stenosis leading to significant malnutrition in the first few
months of life when compared to their unaffected siblings at school age show a significant
lack of short-term memory and an impairment of attention span. No differences in
overall intelligence was appreciated between the groups. (Journal of Pediatrics, April
1975). Many children with Bartter's syndrome show significant degrees of mental im-
pairment (Nephron 23:130, 1979).
Patients with chloride diarrhea (J. Pediatrics 91:738, 1977) (Acta Endocrino-
logica 55, 1967) or Bartter's syndrome (Pediatrics 46:344, 1970), which of course are
lifetime illnesses, frequently have significant kidney damage and may, in fact, suc-
cumb to kidney failure.
At the present time our infants affected by Neo-Mull-Soy@ are being followed
prospectively to gain data which will hopefully answer [the] question. I have noted
developmental delay and significantly smaller head circumferences (indicating sub-
normal brain growth) in the majority of affected infants which I have examined. The
degree of recovery, however, will take several years of testing and observation to come
to a final conclusion . . .
[M]ore questions than answers have been raised by this recent discovery. I am
optimistic that answers can be obtained but I have occasional pangs of fear that there
are not too many investigators who share my concerns for these affected infants. I also
know that there are many infants who were surely affected by the formula but who
have escaped medical detection just because the formula was changed and the infants
were not critically evaluated medically.
Letter from Shane Roy, M.D. to Michael C. Jainchill, Esq. (Dec. 19, 1979) (submitted to
the Medical Malpractice Exchange of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America).
133 Pilot, Regulatory Update-New Enforcement Approaches and International Device Regu-
lation, 34 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 132 (1979). (Mr. Pilot's comment was not made in the
context of the infant formula chloride deficiency problem.).
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